PENNSYLVANIA FRATERNAL ORDER OF CONSTABLES

Facts of the Case

In December 1821, Constable John Topham of Philadelphia arrested one Albert Canfire for committing a breach of the peace in the constable’s direct presence. Topham transported Canfire to the Philadelphia city prison for safekeeping pending a hearing before a magistrate. Israel Deacon, the prison keeper, refused to receive Canfire without a prior written warrant from a justice of the peace. The Mayor’s Court of Philadelphia indicted Deacon for the refusal. A jury at Nisi Prius before Judge Duncan returned a verdict for the Commonwealth, subject to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion on whether such a refusal was indictable at law. Counsel for the Commonwealth argued the constable’s arrest authority for a breach of the peace in his presence was unquestionable, and that the prison existed precisely to secure such prisoners. Defense counsel Bradford warned that a bare officer’s charge, without a magistrate’s warrant, was an insufficient basis to require the jailer’s cooperation and risked arbitrary detention.

Questions

1. Does a constable possess common law authority to arrest without warrant a person committing a breach of the peace in his presence and convey that person to the county jail pending a magistrate hearing?
2. Is the keeper of a common jail legally bound to receive such a prisoner from a constable without requiring a prior written warrant of commitment?
3. Is a jailer’s refusal to receive a prisoner so delivered indictable as a criminal offense?

Conclusions

Justice Gibson affirmed the verdict and held the indictment sufficient. His opinion is brief but foundational. A constable may deposit a prisoner arrested without warrant in the county jail for safekeeping until presentation before a magistrate. Gibson reasoned by analogy — even a private person arresting for treason or felony may convey the prisoner to the jail — and concluded that a commissioned peace officer could not possess less authority. The opinion’s central proposition has anchored Pennsylvania constable law for two centuries: a constable is “a known officer, charged with the conservation of the peace, and whose business it is to arrest those who have violated it.” From this, Gibson drew an institutional conclusion: officers of justice are bound to assist each other across departments, and it “would be strange” if a jailer could refuse the most efficient assistance available — the confinement of an arrested party. On the civil liberties objection, Gibson was direct: if the arrest is improper, the prisoner has “instant redress by the writ of habeas corpus,” and the constable faces indictment or trespass damages. Withholding the jailer’s cooperation would “greatly and unnecessarily lessen” the constable’s capacity to quell affrays and secure prisoners. The indictment stood.

Blackstone Compared — “Great Original and Inherent Authority”

Gibson cited no authority by name, but his framework is drawn directly from the Blackstonian common law then governing Pennsylvania courts. Blackstone treated constable arrest powers in two places. In Book I, p. 355, he declared: “The general duty of all constables, both high and petty, as well as of the other officers, is to keep the king’s peace in their several districts; and to that purpose they are armed with very large powers, of arresting, and imprisoning, of breaking open houses, and the like.” Gibson’s formulation — “charged with the conservation of the peace, and whose business it is to arrest those who have violated it” — is a direct condensation of this text. In Book IV, p. 289, Blackstone was more emphatic: “The constable … hath great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He may, without warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace.” The word “inherent” is decisive — constable arrest power belongs to the office itself, not to statutory delegation. Blackstone further specified that in felony cases the constable’s authority operates “as upon a justice’s warrant.” If the warrantless arrest carries the weight of a formal warrant, Deacon’s refusal was as indefensible as refusing a prisoner delivered under process. Gibson applied Blackstone precisely, without citing him.

Current Law — The Holding Codified

What Justice Gibson established by common law reasoning in 1822 the Pennsylvania General Assembly has since codified in statutory form. Title 61 Pa.C.S. § 1154 expressly provides that sheriffs, constables, members of the Pennsylvania State Police, and other persons authorized by law to make arrests “shall have the use, for a period not to exceed 48 hours, of borough and township lockups and county correctional institutions for the detention of persons arrested until they can be disposed of according to law, if found necessary by the officer in charge.” The statute names constables explicitly and alongside State Police — confirming that their status as authorized arresting officers entitles them to the full cooperation of county correctional facilities, precisely as Deacon held. The jailer’s duty Gibson derived from common law institutional logic is now a statutory command. Section 1154 does not condition the constable’s right on the existence of a magistrate’s warrant; it conditions it only on a lawful arrest and the officer’s determination that jail detention is necessary — the same standard Gibson applied in 1822. The 48-hour outer limit codifies the “as soon as circumstances will permit” best-practice Gibson described, transforming a common law guideline into an enforceable deadline. Any county correctional officer today who refuses to receive a constable’s prisoner on the ground that constables lack authority stands in direct violation of both Deacon and § 1154.

Editorial Note: The principle Deacon established — that the county jail must receive a constable’s prisoner — is no longer merely common law. It is the express command of 61 Pa.C.S. § 1154.

Syllabus
Opinion of the Court — Justice Gibson

Petitioner
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Respondent
Israel Deacon, Keeper of the Prison of Philadelphia

Docket No.
(Not assigned under modern convention)

Decided By
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 1822

Lower Court
Mayor’s Court of the City of Philadelphia (Duncan, J., Nisi Prius)

Citation
Commonwealth v. Deacon, 8 Serg. & R. 47 (Pa. 1822)

Argued
December 1821

Decided
1822

Advocates
Kittera — for the Commonwealth

Bradford — for Israel Deacon, contra